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TACKLING MERITLESS BID PROTESTS: THE 
CASE FOR REBALANCING PROTEST COSTS 
IN THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT ARENA 
Eric S. Underwood* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Green Bay might not have had any time left in its season if not for referee Gene Ster-
atore’s decision. Dez Bryant’s leaping, bobbling [thirty-one]-yard catch at the Packers 
[one] on a fourth-and-[two] play was challenged by Green Bay coach Mike McCarthy. 
Instead of first-and-goal for Dallas . . . the ball went over to the Packers.1 
The Official Playing Rules of the National Football League (NFL) afford each 
team two opportunities per game to challenge various rulings on the field (the 
Coaches’ Challenge Rule).2 To challenge an official ruling, a coach simply throws a 
red flag onto the field from the sideline.3 Each challenge triggers an instant replay of 
the previous play.4 After review, the presiding official either confirms or reverses the 
challenged ruling on the field.5 
On January 11, 2015, Green Bay Packers Head Coach Mike McCarthy used one 
of his challenges after Dallas Cowboys wide receiver Dez Bryant appeared to have 
completed a catch at the Packers’ one-yard line.6 With four minutes and six seconds 
left in the fourth quarter and the Cowboys then leading the game by one point, Coach 
McCarthy knew that if the Cowboys scored a touchdown, his team’s chances of a 
victory were slim to none.7 “That was such an impactful play,” McCarthy exclaimed 
after the game.8 “You have to challenge that,” he continued.9 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, The University of Tulsa College of Law, 2017. First and foremost, I thank my wife, Taylor, 
for her unwavering love, support, and confidence in me. I also thank my Tulsa Law Review colleagues for their con-
structive feedback and their exceptional efforts to refine this article into a finished product. 
 1. David Purdum, Associated Press, Two Second-Half TDs Help Packers Rally vs. Cowboys, ESPN.COM (Jan. 11, 
2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId=400749518. 
 2. ROGER GOODELL, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 63 (2015), available 
at http://operations.nfl.com/the-rules/2015-nfl-rulebook.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Vic Ketchman, McCarthy’s Challenge Saves the Day, PACKERS.COM (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.packers.com/ 
news-and-events/article-game-recap/article-1/McCarthys-challenge-saves-the-day/e3599c4d-da8f-430c-8dbb-
5f05643d18ca. 
 7. Purdum, supra note 1. 
 8. Ketchman, supra note 6. 
 9. Id. 
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Fortunately for the Packers, Coach McCarthy’s judicious use of a challenge con-
vinced referee Gene Steratore to reverse the previous ruling on the field that Bryant 
made the catch.10 The reversed call elicited a turnover on downs and a significant 
momentum shift in favor of the Packers, who went on to defeat the Cowboys 26-21 
and earned themselves a chance to play the Seattle Seahawks for the 2014 National 
Football Conference title.11 
While a successful Coaches’ Challenge—especially on a crucial play—can con-
tribute significantly to a victory for the challenging team, it does not guarantee a vic-
tory.12 Indeed, the Coaches’ Challenge Rule cuts both ways.13 For example, in 2014, 
Kansas City Chiefs Head Coach Andy Reid challenged an official’s ruling that San 
Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick scrambled for a first down on a key 
third-down play.14 Reid had a clear, up-close look at the play and was confident that 
his opponent did not pick up the first down; so he tossed his red flag onto the field, 
initiating an instant replay.15 After review, the official confirmed the ruling on the 
field.16 The 49ers retained possession of the ball and subsequently scored the winning 
touchdown in their 22-17 victory against the Chiefs.17 
Just as NFL coaches can challenge an official ruling on the field, in the arena of 
federal procurement, contractors enjoy similar opportunities to challenge the govern-
ment’s contracting decisions.18 Filing a protest in one of three venues is the “red flag” 
that initiates such a challenge.19 Additionally, like a Coaches’ Challenge, which does 
not guarantee the challenging team a victory even if the challenge is successful, a 
successful protest does not guarantee that the protestor will ultimately win a govern-
ment contract.20 In fact, it is extremely rare for a protestor to win a contract subse-
quent to a successful protest.21 
To illustrate this rarity, in fiscal year 2010 (FY10), out of roughly 1,500 protests 
filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the GAO sustained merely 
forty-five protests.22 Of those sustained protests, only eight resulted in a favorable 
contract award for the protestor.23 Notwithstanding this statistical improbability, be-
tween FY01 and FY14, the frequency of protests to the GAO increased by roughly 
125% (from 1,146 in FY01 to 2,561 in FY14).24 Conversely, during the same period, 
                                                          
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Randy Covitz, Chiefs’ Reid is Up to the Challenge When it’s Time to Throw the Red Flag, KAN. CITY STAR 
(Oct. 10, 2014), available at http://www.kansascity.com/sports/nfl/kansas-city-chiefs/article2669622.html/ (dis-
cussing Kansas City Chiefs Coach Andy Reid’s unsuccessful challenge during the Chiefs’ game against San Francisco). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Covitz, supra Note 12. 
 18. See generally FAR 33 (2016). 
 19. Id. 33.103-105. 
 20. MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KATE M. MANUEL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. NO. R40227, GAO 
PROTESTS: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 9 (July 21, 2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40227.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 3, 4 fig. 1.  
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the frequency of sustained protests as a percentage of protests filed decreased by over 
fifty percent (from 6% in FY01 to 2.9% in FY14).25 
The increasing frequency of federal procurement protests to the GAO is sub-
ject to vigorous debate among government officials, end users of federal acquisitions, 
and academics.26 On one hand, protests empower contractors to hold the govern-
ment accountable for its business decisions.27 On the other hand, protests increase 
the government’s cost of doing business.28 
While there are several debates over whether the benefits of protests outweigh 
the costs, one thing is certain: the government, as opposed to its private sector coun-
terparts, bears the majority of costs that arise out of procurement protests.29 Of the 
several factors that contribute to this phenomenon, one is especially intriguing—that 
an interested party who does not win a government contract has little more to lose 
by protesting the award in a misguided attempt to increase his chances of ultimately 
getting a contract.30 
Beyond the administrative costs of preparing the protest, as former Under Sec-
retary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Dr. Jacques Gansler, 
once put it, an offeror can essentially protest “for the price of a stamp.”31 In stark 
contrast, upon receipt of a protest, the federal contracting agency must stay perfor-
mance of the awarded contract, address each aspect of the procurement with which 
the offeror takes issue, seek legal counsel, file a response, and wait for the respective 
agency or the GAO to resolve the protest.32 If the GAO sustains the protest, the 
government may become further obligated to pay the protestor’s costs—exclusive of 
profit—of filing the protest, including reasonable attorney, consultant, and expert 
witness fees, as well as bid and proposal preparation costs.33 If the GAO dismisses 
or denies the protest, however, the protestor is not similarly obligated to reimburse 
the government’s costs to resolve the protest.34 
                                                          
 25. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 8 fig. 5. 
 26. See, e.g., Andy Medici & Jim McElhatton, How Bid Protests are Slowing Down Procurements, FED. TIMES, Jul. 21, 
2013, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130721/ ACQUISITION03/307210001 (discussing various costs as-
sociated with bid protests); see also Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 489 (2013) (analyzing well-recognized costs and benefits that protests impose on federal procure-
ments). 
 27. KATE M. MANUEL & MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. NO. R40228, GAO 
BID PROTESTS: AN OVERVIEW OF TIME FRAMES AND PROCEDURES 3 (Jan. 19, 2016), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40228.pdf. 
 28. Id. at 3-4. 
 29. See generally Gordon, supra note 26; FAR 33.104 (2016) (enumerating the procuring agency’s responsibilities 
and costs that arise out of a protest). 
 30. Eric S. Crusius, Acquisition 101: When a Bargain Isn’t a Bargain, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2015/01/acquisition-101-when-bargain-isnt-bargain/102672; see also 
SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 9 (illustrating the low probability that a successful protest results in the 
protestor ultimately getting a contract). 
 31. JACQUES S. GANSLER, AFFORDING DEFENSE 191 (1991); but see 4 C.F.R. § 21(f) (2016) (the current regulation 
permits offerors to submit protests via hand delivery, mail, commercial carrier, facsimile, or email). 
 32. See generally FAR 33.104 (2016) (enumerating the procuring agency’s responsibilities in response to a protest). 
 33. Id. 33.104(h). 
 34. Id. (There is no requirement for an interested party whose protest is dismissed to reimburse the government’s 
costs of addressing the protest). 
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The objectives of this article are (1) to highlight the imbalance in which protest 
costs are borne between the government and its private sector counterparts and (2) 
to explore potential solutions to more equitably balance protest costs—especially 
those associated with dismissed protests—in order to reduce the burden protests im-
pose on government programs and, ultimately, taxpayers.35 In response to this anal-
ysis, Congress should amend protest regulations to require protestors to include a 
bond with their protest equal to a percentage of the total contract value in an effort 
to (1) suppress the apparent “What do we have to lose?” mentality that the current 
protest system perpetuates and (2) to decrease the frequency of meritless protests. 
Part II of this article clarifies the issue at hand with a brief overview of the 
federal acquisition system, including a discussion that defines “protest” and identifies 
who may protest, reasons one might file a protest, and the mechanics of filing a pro-
test.36 Part III evaluates the costs and benefits that protests impose on the federal 
procurement system and accepts, for the sake of argument, that the overarching ben-
efits of protests justify the costs.37 Part IV posits that, due to the inverse relationship 
between the frequency of protests and the number of sustained protests, the question 
should not be whether the benefits of protests outweigh the costs, but whether op-
portunities exist to decrease meritless protests and the government’s administrative 
costs associated with resolving them.38 Part IV also explores historically proposed 
solutions to address this issue and offers a new solution inspired by existing state 
procurement laws as well as previously unmentioned intricacies of the NFL’s 
Coaches’ Challenge Rule.39 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) codifies the processes and proce-
dures by which the federal government acquires goods and services for executive 
agencies.40 The overarching purpose of the FAR is to “deliver . . . the best value 
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling 
public policy objectives.”41 To that end, the FAR aims to “satisfy the customer in 
terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service”; “minimize 
administrative operating costs”; and “conduct business with integrity, fairness, and 
openness.”42 Inherent in these principles is the objective to promote competition for 
government contracts.43 
                                                          
 35. See discussion infra Parts III & IV. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II. 
 37. See discussion infra Part III. 
 38. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 39. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 40. FAR 1.1 (2016).  
 41. Id. 1.102(a). 
 42. Id. 1.102(b). 
 43. Id. 1.102(b)(1)(iii). 
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 25
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol52/iss2/25
 2017] TACKLING MERITLESS BID PROTESTS 371 
B. Protesting Government Procurement Actions 
1. “Protest” Defined 
A “protest” is “a written objection by an interested party” to: (1) a solicitation 
or request for offers for a procurement, (2) the cancellation of a solicitation, (3) a 
contract award or proposed contract award, or (4) a contract termination.44 For sim-
plicity, one can classify protests into two categories: “pre-award” and “post-award.”45 
By contrast, the GAO may not consider—among several enumerated issues—con-
tract administration concerns, contracting officer determinations of contractor re-
sponsibility, untimely protests, protests that lack sufficient legal or factual grounds, 
or subcontract protests.46 
2. Who may Protest 
Only interested parties may file a protest.47 An interested party is “an actual or 
prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award 
of a contract or . . . failure to award a contract.”48 Typically, prior to contract award, 
any prospective bidder qualifies as an interested party.49 Conversely, after contract 
award, offerors who actually submitted bids or proposals are interested parties, as 
only those offerors were eligible for award.50 Naturally, the “focus upon direct eco-
nomic interest in determining who is an interested party means that a larger number 
of contractors can generally bring pre-award protests than can bring post-award pro-
tests.”51 Concerned citizens and subcontractors usually lack standing to file a protest 
because they have no direct economic interest in the procurement outcome.52 
3. Reasons to Protest 
Offerors protest federal contracting actions for a variety of reasons.53 First, 
protests often stem from an offeror’s belief that the government made a material 
error during the bidding process.54 Commonly cited errors include “poorly written 
or vague contract requirements, failure to follow the process or [evaluation] criteria 
laid out in the request for proposals, and failure to adequately document government 
                                                          
 44. Id. 33.101.   
 45. See, e.g., FAR 15.507(a) (2016) (advising that “[u]se of agency protest procedures that incorporate the alterna-
tive dispute resolution provisions of Executive Order 12979 is encouraged for both preaward and postaward protests.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 46. 4 C.F.R. § 21.5 (2016) (Nor may the GAO hear protests related to Small Business Administration issues, 
procurement integrity, procurements by non-federal agencies, suspensions and debarments, competitive range deter-
minations, or decisions to file a protest on behalf of federal employees).  
 47. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BID PROTESTS AT GAO: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 6 (9th ed. 2009), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/ decisions/bidpro/bid/d09417sp.pdf.  
 48. FAR 33.101 (2016).  
 49. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 6.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 54. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 11. 
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findings.”55 An unsuccessful offeror might also protest if the procuring agency did 
not debrief the offeror after contract award.56 This can create the perception that the 
procuring agency treated the contractor unfairly during the award process and, as a 
result, often invites offerors to protest simply to gain access to information that 
would otherwise become known during a debriefing.57 Notably, however, the gov-
ernment is only required to provide a debriefing upon an unsuccessful offeror’s 
timely request, so the onus to initiate a debriefing is on the offeror.58 
As further motivation to file a protest, analysts cite “the increase in value of 
individual contracts, longer periods of contract performance, policy trends to in-
source more work, and decreased defense spending.”59 These factors increase con-
tractors’ appetite for work and consequently make them more likely to protest unfa-
vorable contract awards.60 This is especially true for incumbent contractors who do 
not win a follow-on contract after their current contract expires.61 Since a GAO pro-
test prevents the procuring agency from awarding a contract until the protest is re-
solved, incumbent contractors in this situation may be able to squeeze a few more 
months—and additional revenue—out of their current contracts.62 
Another economic incentive to protest especially exists within the realm of ma-
jor defense acquisitions.63 In this “high-stakes, winner-take-all world . . . the winner 
secures future revenue for decades.”64 As one government contracts attorney 
acknowledged, “For the winner, it’s going to be worth billions of dollars over the 
next 20 years. For the loser, they go home.”65 Aside from major defense acquisitions, 
but on a related note, federal agencies are increasingly relying on strategic sourcing 
for routine commodities and services in order to maximize the government’s buying 
power.66 While strategic sourcing may secure better deals for the government, it also 
limits opportunities to compete for government contracts.67 Thus, prospective con-
tractors are willing to go to great lengths to win a contract, which may include filing 
a protest.68 
                                                          
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.; see also FAR 15.505(e), 15.506(d) (2016) (identifying the information an unsuccessful offeror may request 
upon elimination from the competition).  
 58. FAR 15.505(a)(1), 15.506(a)(1) (2016). Accordingly, in most cases, if an unsuccessful offeror did not receive 
a debriefing, it is because it did not request one.  
 59. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 11.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 11-12. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., TOMMY M. GATES, THIRD-PARTY PROTEST REGIME AND GAO PROTEST STATISTICS: DOD VS. 
OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES 15 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a539659.pdf (dis-
cussing economic interests in protesting major defense acquisitions). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 15-16 (citing Richard Lardner, Do Defense Contractors Protest Too Much?, USA TODAY, May 24, 2008, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-05-23-3339653735_x.htm). 
 66. GATES, supra note 63, at 16. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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In addition to these glaring economic incentives, some contractors protest in 
an attempt to influence procurement agency behavior in future competitions.69 
Moreover, a contractor might protest to demonstrate to its shareholders and senior 
leadership that it exhausted all available strategies to secure work.70 Protests also en-
able contractors to potentially stifle their competition by delaying a contract award.71 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the costs to file a protest are extremely 
minimal.72 Thus, the marginal cost to file a protest beyond the time and expense a 
contractor incurs to prepare a contract proposal essentially promotes a “What do we 
have to lose?” mentality among contractors whose proposals do not result in a con-
tract award.73 
4. The Mechanics of a Protest 
An interested party may file a protest with the procuring agency, the GAO, or 
the Court of Federal Claims.74 The GAO, however, hears more protests than the 
Court of Federal Claims.75 Moreover, statistics are not readily available to analyze 
protests across all federal agencies.76 Accordingly, the scope of this article is limited 
to protests to the GAO.77 
A protest to the GAO begins when an interested party timely submits a notice 
to the GAO that: (1) identifies the contracting agency and the solicitation or contract 
number; (2) lists the legal and factual grounds of protest; (3) establishes that the pro-
testor is an interested party; and (4) states the relief requested (e.g., termination or re-
competition of a contract).78 Beyond these requirements, “[n]o formal briefs or other 
technical forms of pleading or motion are required.”79 A pre-award protest is timely 
if the procuring agency receives it prior to the deadline to submit proposals.80 A post-
award protest, on the other hand, is timely if the procuring agency receives it “not 
later than [ten] days after the basis of protest is known or should have been known 
(whichever is earlier).”81 
                                                          
 69. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 12. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See 4 C.F.R. § 21.1(c), (f) (2016) (outlining the requirements to file a protest). 
 73. Defense Industry Daily Staff, How the US GAO’s Bid Protest Process Works and Why Defense Contractors Abuse It, 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY (April 22, 2010, 7:51 PM), http:// www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gao-protests-de-
fense-programs-06269. 
 74. FAR 33.103-105 (2016). 
 75. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1.  
 76. Id. 
 77. See discussion infra Parts I-V.  
 78. 4 C.F.R. § 21.1(c) (2016). 
 79. Id. § 21.1(f).   
 80. Id. § 21.2(a)(1).   
 81. Id. § 21.2(a)(2); but see id. §§ 21.2(a)(2)-(3), 21.2(c) (providing the following exceptions to this rule: First, “with 
respect to any protest basis which is known or should have been known either before or as a result of the debriefing, 
the initial protest shall not be filed before the debriefing date offered to the protester, but shall be filed not later than 
10 days after the date on which the debriefing is held.” Additionally, “[i]f a timely agency-level protest was previously 
filed, any subsequent protest to GAO filed within 10 days of actual or constructive knowledge of initial adverse 
agency action will be considered . . . .” Finally, the GAO may consider an untimely protest “for good cause shown, 
or where it determines that a protest raises issues significant to the procurement system.”). 
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Upon receipt of a protest, the GAO must notify the procuring agency of the 
protest within one business day.82 The agency then relays the protest to the contract 
awardee if the agency awarded a contract.83 If the agency did not award a contract, it 
must send the protest to all offerors eligible to receive a contract.84 Once a procuring 
agency becomes aware of a pre-award protest, it may not award a contract until the 
GAO resolves the protest, unless the head of the contracting activity determines that 
“[u]rgent and compelling circumstances which significantly affect the interest of the 
United States will not permit awaiting the decision of the GAO.”85 In federal pro-
curement lingo, a protest elicits an “automatic stay”—also referred to as a “Compe-
tition in Contracting Act (CICA) stay”—on contract award.86 
Similarly, upon notice of a post-award protest, “the contracting officer shall 
immediately suspend performance or terminate the awarded contract” until the GAO 
decides the protest.87 In addition to the “urgent and compelling circumstances” ex-
ception, the procuring agency may also proceed to award a contract if the head of the 
contracting activity determines that “[c]ontract performance will be in the best inter-
ests of the United States.”88 
Along with an automatic stay of contract award or performance, notice of a 
GAO protest triggers the procuring agency’s duty to respond to the protest.89 Spe-
cifically, within thirty days of being notified of the protest, the procuring agency must 
submit to the GAO: 
[T]he contracting officer’s statement of the relevant facts, including a best estimate of 
the contract value, a memorandum of law, and a list and a copy of all relevant docu-
ments, or portions of documents, not previously produced, including, as appropriate: 
the protest; the bid or proposal submitted by the protester; the bid or proposal of the 
firm which is being considered for award, or whose bid or proposal is being protested; 
all evaluation documents; the solicitation, including the specifications; the abstract of 
bids or offers; and any other relevant documents. In appropriate cases, a party may 
request that another party produce relevant documents, or portions of documents, 
that are not in the agency’s possession.90 
The protestor must comment on the agency’s report and submit its comments 
to the GAO within ten calendar days after the GAO receives the agency’s report.91 
                                                          
 82. Id. § 21.3(a).  
 83. 4 C.F.R. § 21.3(a) (2016). 
 84. Id.  
 85. FAR 33.104(b)(1) (2016).  
 86. See, e.g., MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 11. 
 87. FAR 33.104(c)(1)-(2) (2016); see also EOD Tech., Inc. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 12 (2008) (upholding the 
Army’s override of an automatic stay in a procurement for canine services for the Army Special Forces due to the 
“urgent and compelling” need to mitigate the high risk of security breaches on military installations in Afghanistan); 
see also TEAC Am. v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 876 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that the Navy’s override 
of a protest regarding a contract for a cockpit video recording system for the F/A-18 aircraft was in the “best interest 
of the United States” because failure to override would interfere with the aircraft’s deployment to Bosnia and troop 
training and the public interest required that the troops be well equipped). 
 88. FAR 33.104(c)(2) (2016). 
 89. 4 C.F.R. § 21.3(c) (2016).  
 90. Id. § 21.3(d). 
 91. Id. §21.3(i). 
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Subject to few exceptions, the GAO will dismiss the protest if the protestor fails to 
submit comments within the ten-day period.92 Generally, the GAO must decide the 
protest within one hundred days of the filing date.93 In FY14, the GAO resolved 
protests on average within thirty-nine days.94 
The GAO may dismiss, deny, or sustain a protest.95 The GAO ordinarily dis-
misses protests containing procedural defects such as (1) failure to address all require-
ments of 4 C.F.R. § 21.1 or (2) untimely filing.96 Similarly, if the GAO finds that the 
procuring agency complied with procurement statutes or regulations, it denies the 
protest.97 In either case, the procuring agency may proceed with its procurement 
once the GAO announces its decision.98 Conversely, if the GAO determines that the 
procuring agency violated procurement regulations, it sustains the protest and rec-
ommends that the agency implement one or more of several available remedies.99 
Additionally, the GAO may recommend that the procuring agency reimburse the 
protestor for its costs of “(1) [f]iling and pursuing the protest, including attorneys’ 
fees and consultant and expert witness fees; and (2) [b]id and proposal prepara-
tion.”100 
Interestingly, GAO decisions and recommendations are not legally binding 
upon procuring agencies since “GAO is a legislative . . . agency and cannot constitu-
tionally compel executive . . . agencies to implement its recommendations because of 
the separation of powers doctrine.”101 Nevertheless, procuring agencies usually im-
plement GAO recommendations.102 
III. PROTEST COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Without question, protests promote integrity within the procurement system 
and enable interested parties to hold the government accountable for its business 
decisions.103 These benefits, however, do not come without a cost.104 On the con-
                                                          
 92. Id. 
 93. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1) (2012); but see id. § 3554(a)(2) (under the “express option,” the GAO must decide a 
protest within 65 days from the filing date).   
 94. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 14. The authors note that the GAO provided this data; however, 
they acknowledge that it may be somewhat unreliable.  
 95. See FAR 33.104(a)(2) (2016) (mentioning that the GAO may deny a protest); see also id. 33.104(a)(3)(i)(A) 
(identifying that the GAO may dismiss a protest); see also id. 33.104(h)(8) (outlining a situation in which the GAO 
might sustain a protest). 
 96. 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.1(i), 21.2(b) (2016).  
 97. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 15. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(a) (2016). The available remedies are: (1) refrain from exercising options under the contract; 
(2) terminate the contract; (3) re-compete the contract; (4) issue a new solicitation; (5) award a contract consistent 
with statute or regulation; or such other recommendation(s) as GAO determines necessary to promote compliance. 
 100. Id. § 21.8(d). 
 101. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 16 (citing Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 809 F.2d 
979, 986 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 102. Id. at 16-17. Between FY01 and FY14, only in forty-two cases did a procuring agency decline to fully adopt 
the GAO’s recommendations. 
 103. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 2. 
 104. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3-4. 
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trary, protests impose costs on the federal procurement system that impact the gov-
ernment, contractors, and taxpayers.105 Whether these benefits outweigh the costs is 
subject to vigorous debate.106 For example, in response to the 39% increase in De-
fense Department protests between 2001 and 2008, former acting Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, John Young Jr., asserted that 
“[p]rotests are extremely detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer” and ob-
served that “protest actions consume vast amounts of time for acquisition, legal[,] 
and requirements team members; delay program initiation and the delivery of capa-
bility; strain relations with our industry partners and stakeholders; and create misper-
ceptions among American citizens.”107 One of Young’s industry counterparts at Boe-
ing similarly expressed, “At the end of the day, [protests] really slow[] down the 
process of getting hardware and services to the warfighter.”108 
Those at the other end of the spectrum applaud the protest system’s emphases 
on transparency and accountability and downplay the costs borne by federal procure-
ment stakeholders.109 The holders of this viewpoint remain steadfast that the benefits 
of the protest system outweigh its costs.110 Moreover, some argue that the govern-
ment’s costs to address protests “are often misunderstood and therefore overstated, 
in terms of the frequency of protests, the length of time that they last, and the risk 
that the agency’s choice of contractor will be overturned in the process.”111 
This article by no means attempts to resolve the tension between the social, 
economic, political, and practical undertones of these opposing viewpoints.112 To 
fully appreciate the forthcoming recommendation, however, requires a brief discus-
sion of the well-recognized costs and benefits of federal procurement protests.113 
A. Protest Costs 
Protests levy direct and indirect costs on the federal procurement system.114 
The vast majority of direct costs come in the form of procurement delays and admin-
                                                          
 105. Robert Brodsky, Bidders Bite Back, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.govexec.com/ magazine/fea-
tures/2011/02/bidders-bite-back/33195. 
 106. See generally id. (discussing several opposing viewpoints—including those of industry executives and federal 
procurement officials—on protest benefits and costs); see also Gordon, supra note 26 (discussing the costs and benefits 
of protests in federal procurement). 
 107. Brodsky, supra note 105. 
 108. Id. (quoting Daniel Beck, spokesman for The Boeing Company). 
 109. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 26, at 510 (asserting that “[w]hatever costs protests impose on the procurement 
system are outweighed . . . by the benefits that protests bring, in terms of transparency, accountability, education, and 
protection of the integrity of the U.S. federal acquisition system.”); see also Brodsky, supra note 105 (quoting Ralph 
White, GAO’s Managing Associate General Counsel for Procurement Law, “What you get [via the protest system] 
is a lot more transparency, integrity, or accountability than in other places . . . . It’s a system I would hate to walk 
away from and think about what it would mean to provide no opportunity for a redress when people think that 
something was unfair.”). 
 110. Gordon, supra note 26, at 510; Brodsky, supra note 105. 
 111. Gordon, supra note 26, at 510. 
 112. See discussion infra Parts I-V. 
 113. See discussion infra Part III.  
 114. See discussion infra Part III.A.  
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istrative costs, whereas indirect costs stem largely from behavioral effects that pro-
tests—or, perhaps more accurately, the fear of protests—have on federal procure-
ment officials.115 
1. Procurement Delays 
Within the context of procurement delays, the CICA stay is the most obvious 
delay that protests generate.116 Subject to the exceptions discussed above, under 
CICA, a procuring agency may not award a contract in the midst of a pending pre-
award protest to the GAO.117 Similarly, in the case of a post-award protest, the con-
tracting agency must suspend contract performance until the GAO resolves the pro-
test.118 In either case, a CICA stay commences after a contractor files a timely protest 
and the GAO subsequently notifies the respective contracting agency.119 
In theory, a CICA stay may last as long as one hundred days—the number of 
days in which the GAO must typically resolve a protest.120 Thus, unless the agency 
overrides the CICA stay or extends the period of performance of an existing contract 
(via a “bridge contract”) to continue service during the stay, the end user of the pro-
curement may suffer mission delays lasting as long as one hundred days.121 Ironically, 
to override a CICA stay or award a bridge contract also involves intense bureaucratic 
scrutiny that may contribute to additional delays within the existing one hundred day 
window.122 Moreover, a protestor may appeal a CICA stay override to the United 
States Court of Federal Claims, which, if successful, reinstates the automatic stay.123 
Another unfortunate consequence of the CICA stay is it creates the presumptive per-
ception that the contracting agency violated procurement regulations.124 
In addition to the CICA stay, further mission delays may result if the procuring 
agency takes corrective action in response to a GAO protest.125 That is, after it re-
ceives a protest, the procuring agency perceives that it may have erred during the 
bidding process and voluntarily corrects its mistake.126 Of course, “[s]uch voluntary 
action by an agency could indicate that the agency believes that a given protest has 
merit,” which renders this cost outside the scope of the issues this article intends to 
                                                          
 115. See id.  
 116. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 11. 
 117. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (2012). 
 118. Id. § 3553(d)(3)(a). 
 119. Id. § 3553(d)(3), (4). 
 120. Id. § 3554(a)(1); but see id. § 3554(a)(2) (discussing the sixty-five day time frame under the “express option”). 
 121. Id. § 3553(c)(2)(A), (d)(3)(C); see also Kevin J. Wilkinson & John M. Page, CICA Stays Revisited: Keys to Successful 
Overrides, 66 A.F. L. REV. 135, 152-54 (2010) (discussing the use of “bridge contracts” to alleviate mission impacts 
associated with automatic CICA stays). 
 122. See Wilkinson & Page, supra note 121, at 155 (observing that “decisions to override CICA stays must be made 
judiciously and are subject to intense scrutiny” and that “bridge contracts are plausible alternatives to overrides pro-
vided they are tailored appropriately to bridge gaps in necessary services and do not circumvent federal procurement 
law.”). 
 123. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 13 n. 95 (observing that, “[s]ince Ramcor Servs. Group, Inc. v. United 
States, 183 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1999), all such suits have been brought in the Court of Federal Claims.”). 
 124. GATES, supra note 63, at 23. 
 125. Gordon, supra note 26, at 502 (citing SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40227, GAO BID 
PROTESTS: TRENDS, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 10 (2011)). 
 126. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 125, at 5. 
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address.127 Nevertheless, corrective action can significantly delay an acquisition.128 
For example, if an agency decides to take corrective action, a typical remedy is to re-
compete the requirement, which can easily exceed one hundred days.129 
Similarly, the most significant delays ordinarily occur when the GAO “sustain[s] 
a protest and the agency implements the GAO’s recommendation . . ..”130 As with 
corrective action, the agency often re-competes at least part of the competition, which 
can also exceed delays associated with a CICA stay.131 
2. Administrative Costs 
Protests also increase the administrative costs of the federal procurement sys-
tem.132 Most notably, upon receipt of a protest, the procuring agency must address 
each aspect of the procurement with which the offeror takes issue, seek legal counsel, 
file a response, and wait for the respective agency or the GAO to resolve the pro-
test.133 While the costs associated with these activities are difficult to quantify—as 
every acquisition is unique in its own right—one can confidently speculate that sig-
nificant cost drivers include the complexity of the acquisition, the number of offers 
received, and the value (or estimated value) of the contract award.134 
Additionally, if the GAO sustains a protest, it may recommend that the con-
tracting agency reimburse the protestor’s costs—exclusive of profit—of filing the 
protest, including reasonable attorney, consultant, and expert witness fees, as well as 
bid and proposal preparation costs.135 Like the costs discussed above, these costs are 
difficult to quantify and vary from one acquisition to the next; however, similar fac-
tors likely influence these costs.136 Also inherent in this situation is the GAO’s deter-
mination that a protest has merit, which likewise renders these costs outside those 
                                                          
 127. Id. While the objective of this article is tailored more towards meritless protests, the fact that corrective action 
occasionally occurs in response to a protest is mentioned to identify it as another source of protest-related procure-
ment delays. 
 128. Id. at 10.  
 129. Id. 
 130. Gordon, supra note 26, at 503. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Lardner, supra note 65 (observing that in 2008, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro sought a forty 
million dollar (roughly eight percent) increase to the GAO’s budget to accommodate the steadily growing number of 
contract protests). 
 133. See generally FAR 33.104 (2016) (enumerating the procuring agency’s responsibilities in response to a protest). 
 134. See, e.g., id. 15.404-1(a)(1) (“The Contracting Officer is responsible for evaluating the reasonableness of the 
offered prices. The analytical techniques and procedures described in this section may be used, singly or in combina-
tion with others, to ensure that the final price is fair and reasonable. The complexity and circumstances of each acqui-
sition should determine the level of detail of the analysis required.”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AIR 
FORCE, AIR FORCE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT MANDATORY PROCEDURES [hereinafter 
AFFARS MP] pt. 5333.104(c) (2015), available at https://farsite.hill.af.mil (follow “AFFARS” hyperlink; then follow 
“MP TOC” hyperlink; then follow “MP5333.104 Protests to GAO” hyperlink) (outlining required contents of the 
Agency Report, which include source selection evaluation documents. These documents become more lengthy and 
complex based upon the number of offers received); see also AFFARS MP 5315.3(1.4.1.1) (illustrating that the layers 
of review required for contract actions increase as complexity and contract value increase). 
 135. FAR 33.104(h)(1) (2016).  
 136. Id. 15.404-1(a)(1); AFFARS MP, supra note 134, pts. 5333.104(c), 5315.3(1.4.1.1.); but see 31 U.S.C. § 
3554(c)(2)(B) (2012) (under CICA, with the exception of small businesses, reimbursement of attorneys’ fees may not 
exceed $150 per hour).   
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upon which this article is primarily focused.137 What is of concern, however, is the 
one-sided nature of this remedy, as offerors who protest and lose are not equally 
obligated to reimburse the government’s costs to resolve the protest.138 
A third source of administrative costs is the fact that “[protests] have become 
so common that agencies expect them, build them into their contracting timelines, 
and regularly train their procurement staffs on how to minimize them.”139 While it 
may be prudent to expect protests and prepare procurement personnel to respond 
appropriately to them, the corresponding expense is increased acquisition lead times 
and potentially reduced productivity due to overtraining.140 
3. Indirect Costs 
Protests also indirectly impact the federal acquisition system, as the fear of pro-
tests may negatively influence contracting officers’ business decisions.141 The prime 
example analysts cite is preference to certain source selection procedures (i.e. proposal 
evaluation methods) over others.142 Additionally, some contracting officers are re-
luctant to communicate with their industry counterparts during pre-award procure-
ment stages due to the concern that doing so may invite a protest.143 These behav-
ioral trends work against contracting officers’ efforts to secure best value solutions 
for the government.144 
Specifically, some contracting officers prefer to employ a lowest price techni-
cally acceptable (LPTA) source selection process—even when allowing a tradeoff for 
non-cost factors (e.g. performance, schedule, or technical capability) more appropri-
ately suits their acquisition—based on the perception that an LPTA approach lowers 
their protest risk.145 Statistically, however, offers are no more likely to protest LPTA 
source selections than source selections that allow for a tradeoff.146 Even if they were, 
using LPTA evaluation criteria does not guarantee that an offeror will not file a pro-
test.147 
Additionally, the fear of protests appears to motivate some contracting officers 
to award contracts based on initial proposals instead of taking advantage of the op-
                                                          
 137. Gordon, supra note 26, at 503. 
 138. FAR 33.104(h) (2016). There is no requirement for an interested party whose protest is dismissed to reim-
burse the government’s costs of addressing the protest. 
 139. Medici & McElhatton, supra note 26. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Gordon, supra note 26, at 506. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 506-07.  
 145. Id. at 506; see also FAR 15.101-1(a) (2016) (“A tradeoff process is appropriate when it may be in the best 
interest of the Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than the highest 
technically rated offeror.”); see also id. 15.101-2(a) (“The lowest price technically acceptable source selection process 
is appropriate when best value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the 
lowest evaluated price.”). 
 146. Gordon, supra note 26, at 507. 
 147. Id. 
13
Underwood: Tackling Meritless Bid Protests: The Case for Rebalancing Protest
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016
 380 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:367 
portunity to conduct discussions (i.e. negotiations) with offerors, which the FAR ex-
pressly permits in order to maximize the government’s ability to obtain best value.148 
Contracting officers who succumb to this perceived risk contend, “[D]iscussions with 
offerors are a legal minefield, such that conducting discussions will increase the like-
lihood of a bid protest and improve the protestor’s chances of prevailing if a protest 
is filed.”149 Just as using an LPTA source selection process does not eliminate protest 
risk, however, it is impossible for a contracting officer to completely “protest-proof” 
an acquisition by foregoing the opportunity to conduct discussions.150 
B. Protest Benefits 
While GAO protests impose several costs on the federal acquisition system, 
they also generate several benefits for federal procurement stakeholders—especially 
accountability and transparency.151 Moreover, published GAO decisions enable pro-
curement agencies to intelligently predict the likelihood that the GAO would sustain 
a protest, which motivates such agencies to police themselves to a certain degree and 
take corrective action where appropriate.152 
1. Protests are a Low-Cost Form of Accountability 
Protests offer a relatively low-cost mechanism to bring accountability into the 
acquisition system “by providing disgruntled participants a forum for airing their 
complaints.”153 Arguably, the fact that the GAO investigates issues raised by non-
government parties adds more value to the procurement system in terms of account-
ability than internal government audits.154 After all, “if no one is dissatisfied with the 
way the Government conducted a procurement, then it may not be a wise use of 
auditors’ time to investigate it.”155 
2. Protests Increase Confidence in the Procurement System 
Additionally, protests tend to increase overall confidence in the procurement 
system.156 “[B]y being directly responsive to participants’ complaints, protests can 
increase potential bidders’ confidence in the integrity of the procurement process, 
and thereby lead more players to participate, thus increasing competition. Increased 
competition, in turn, can motivate bidders to offer lower prices, higher quality, or 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 506; see also FAR 15.306(d) (2016) (“Negotiations are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole source 
environment, between the Government and offerors, that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to 
revise its proposal. These negotiations may include bargaining. Bargaining includes persuasion, alteration of assump-
tions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to price, schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other 
terms of a proposed contract. When negotiations are conducted in a competitive acquisition, they take place after 
establishment of the competitive range and are called discussions.”). 
 149. Gordon, supra note 26, at 506. 
 150. Id. at 507. 
 151. See discussion infra Part 3.B.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Gordon, supra note 26, at 507.  
 154. Id. at 507-08. 
 155. Id. at 508. 
 156. Id. 
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both, to contracting agencies.”157 Indeed, “absent such mechanisms, entities might 
be less willing to do business with the government, which could diminish competition 
for government contracts and drive up prices.”158 
Protests also increase the public’s confidence in the system.159 
While the public only rarely focuses on public contracting, having a protest process 
mentioned in the press—as happened when The Boeing Company successfully pro-
tested the Air Force’s award of a tanker contract to Northrup Grumman—may raise 
the public’s trust in the fairness of the Government’s acquisition system and the way 
it spends taxpayer funds.160 
Moreover, protests mitigate the risk that public suspicions about the procure-
ment system remain either unaddressed or uncorrected.161 
3. Protest Risk Empowers Contracting Officers to Stand their Ground 
The risk of a successful protest also affords contracting officers a tactful means 
to withstand potential undue influence from their leadership.162 For example, if pres-
sured to award a sole-source contract when market conditions clearly support a com-
petitive source selection, “the [c]ontracting [o]fficer, who may lack the bureaucratic 
clout to resist the pressure, could point to the risk of a successful protest as one 
additional reason to follow the statutory and regulatory requirements for competi-
tion.”163 
4. GAO Decisions Provide Guidance 
Finally, the GAO widely publishes its protest decisions.164 Accordingly, attor-
neys on both sides of a protest are better able to advise clients on the strengths and 
weaknesses of their respective positions.165 One notable example is that “any corpo-
rate counsel who follows GAO bid protest decisions knows how strictly the GAO 
applies the ‘late is late’ rule, so that counsel will ensure that their client appreciates 
the importance of submitting bids on time.”166 
Likewise, the increasing predictability of GAO opinions can motivate a pro-
curement agency to voluntarily take corrective action in response to a protest that it 
believes the GAO would sustain (i.e. the protest has merit).167 Accordingly, when an 
                                                          
 157. Id.  
 158. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3. 
 159. Gordon, supra note 26, at 508. 
 160. Id. 
 161. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3. 
 162. Gordon, supra note 26, at 508. 
 163. Id.  
 164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Are You Waiting for a Bid Protest Decision?, GAO.GOV, 
http://www.gao.gov/legal/are-you-waiting-for-a-bid-protest-decision/about (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). GAO does 
not publish dismissed protests, however. 
 165. Gordon, supra note 26, at 508-10.   
 166. Id. at 510. 
 167. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 5. 
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agency elects to take corrective action, it thereby mitigates some of the delays trig-
gered by the protest and accelerates its acquisition timeline to deliver the respective 
product or service to the end user.168 
C. The Argument that the Benefits Outweigh the Costs 
Without accepting them as absolute, several compelling arguments exist that 
the benefits of GAO protests outweigh the costs.169 Certainly, protests inject “trans-
parency, accountability, and education” into the federal acquisition system and pro-
mote the integrity of the same.170 Additionally, the ability to protest may reduce any 
public perception that the acquisition system is “corrupt or ineffective.”171 Finally, 
“Congress has . . . historically viewed the benefits of protests as outweighing [their] 
costs.”172 On balance of the opposing viewpoints and factors discussed above, the 
overarching benefits of protests probably do outweigh the costs.173 
IV. THE CASE FOR REBALANCING PROTEST COSTS 
Even if one subscribes to the theory that the benefits of protests outweigh their 
costs, the fact remains that the frequency of GAO protests continues to increase 
while the number of sustained protests continues to decrease.174 As a result, the gov-
ernment suffers the increasing administrative burden to address protests that the 
GAO ultimately dismisses for lack of merit.175 In light of this circumstance, perhaps 
the proper question is not whether the benefits of protests outweigh the costs, but 
whether opportunities exist to decrease meritless protests and the government’s costs 
to resolve them.176 Requiring protestors to submit a bond with their protest equal to 
a percentage of the contract value would likely achieve these objectives.177 
A. Clarifying “Meritless Protest” 
To properly analyze potential solutions to reduce meritless protests first re-
quires an understanding of what constitutes a “meritless protest.”178 In the majority 
of cases, one of three events ends a protest: the GAO dismisses the protest; the pro-
testor withdraws the protest; or the agency and the protestor settle the protest prior 
to the GAO’s decision.179 This indicates that a protestor can obtain relief in ways 
                                                          
 168. Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1 (highlighting common procurement delays associated with protests). 
 169. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 170. Gordon, supra note 26, at 510. 
 171. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3. 
 172. Id. at 4.  
 173. See discussion supra Part III.  
 174. See discussion supra Part I. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 177. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 178. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 179. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 4. 
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that do not require the GAO to sustain a protest.180 How, then, is one to determine 
whether a protest has merit?181 
One model considers a protest “effective” if either of two events transpires: (1) 
the GAO sustains the protest or (2) the procurement agency voluntarily takes correc-
tive action in response to the protest.182 Using historical data, one can calculate an 
“effectiveness rate” by dividing the sum of GAO-sustained protests and protests 
where an agency takes corrective action by the total number of protests filed during 
a given time period.183 Based on this model, “the effectiveness rate is a rough meas-
ure of the number of protests that have actual or potential merit.”184 The average 
effectiveness rate of GAO protests over the last five years is forty-two percent.185 
Expanding this analysis to FY14, out of the 2,561 GAO protests filed, roughly 1,076 
actually had merit and the remaining 1,485 did not.186 To be clear, the costs the gov-
ernment bears as a result of protests in the latter category constitute the source of 
contention in this article.187 
An important distinction exists between protests that lack merit and those that 
are frivolous.188 A protest is frivolous if “a [protestor] grounds its case on arguments 
or issues ‘that are beyond the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and 
no basis for [the party’s position] in law or fact can be or is even arguably shown.’”189 
Moreover, “a legal action found to be without merit is not necessarily frivolous.”190 
It accordingly follows that all frivolous protests lack merit, but not all meritless pro-
tests are frivolous.191 Nevertheless, the solutions discussed below apply equally to 
meritless and frivolous protests.192 
B. Historically Proposed Solutions 
As previously discussed, due to the one-sided nature of the costs assumed by 
the government upon receipt of a protest, a contractor who bids for a government 
contract and loses has little more to lose by protesting the award in an effort to in-
crease its chances of ultimately winning a contract.193 Largely for this reason, critics 
of the current protest system urge that this discrepancy begs a remedy to reduce the 
                                                          
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. (describing one model to determine whether a protest has merit). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 5.  
 185. Id.  
 186. See id. at 3, 5. 1,076 is forty-two percent of 2,561. 
 187. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 188. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Committee on Armed 
Services, United States Senate, and Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, U.S. Gov’t Accounta-
bility Office (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www. gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/401197.htm. 
 189. Id. (citing Abbs v. Prinicipi, 237 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id.. 
 192. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 193. See discussion supra Part I. 
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government’s costs that arise out of meritless protests.194 Historically proposed so-
lutions include sanctioning frivolous protests and allowing procuring agencies to con-
sider an offeror’s protest history during past performance evaluations.195 
1. Sanctions 
In the face of budget constraints during the 1990s, Congress and the Clinton 
administration endeavored to decrease the government’s procurement transaction 
costs.196 Pursuant to that objective, the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel recom-
mended, among several items, that the administration impose sanctions on frivolous 
protests.197 This remedy “would have required protestors who file baseless protests 
to reimburse the [g]overnment for its legal fees and costs associated with defending 
the procurement decision.”198 Congress proposed this idea in the Federal Acquisition 
Improvement Act of 1995; however, it ultimately did not enact the proposal.199 Not-
withstanding the proposal’s failure, Senator John Glenn acknowledged that it was an 
important step in “tackl[ing] the controversial, highly charged issue of reform of the 
protest system by attempting to streamline it and reduce the number of protests 
filed.”200 
The notion of imposing sanctions on frivolous protests continues to surface 
within the acquisition community.201 For example, between 2006 and 2009, the Air 
Force received several GAO protests during its efforts to award a contract for a new 
combat search-and-rescue helicopter (CSAR-X).202 Eventually, “[d]ue to adverse 
findings by [a] Pentagon audit, Defense Secretary Gates decided to cancel the pro-
gram ‘for convenience’ . . . .”203 In response, Air Force General Bruce Carlson—who 
commanded Air Force Material Command at the time—exclaimed that the CSAR-X 
protests delayed vital military programs and estimated that they cost the government 
800 million dollars.204 General Carlson attributed these costs to the ease at which 
unsuccessful offerors can protest and advocated that the government penalize losing 
protestors as a disincentive to file frivolous protests.205 
                                                          
 194. See, e.g., Otto Kreisher, General Bemoans Glut of Air Force Contract Protests, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 13, 2008), 
http://www.govexec.com/defense/2008/02/general-bemoans-glut-of-air-force-contract-protests/26297 (express-
ing United States Air Force General Bruce Carlson’s view that protests are so frequent because there are no penalties 
for a losing bidder to protest). 
 195. See id.; GATES, supra note 63, at 24 (citing Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of 
Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 697 (2001)). 
 196. Jonathan R. Cantor, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone, 27 PUB. CONT. 
L.J. 155, 169-70, 172 (1997) (citing William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 
9 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 461, 464 (1995).  
 197. Id. at 170. 
 198. Id. at 172. 
 199. Id. (citing S. 669, §§ 1202, 1435, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1388, §§ 1202, 1435 (1995)). 
 200. 141 CONG. REC. S5, 147 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1995).  
 201. See, e.g., Defense Industry Daily Staff, supra note 73 (discussing Air Force General Bruce Carlson’s reaction 
to protests on the CSAR-X program).  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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The problem with sanctions, however, turns on “fundamental questions of fair-
ness and the right of access to judicial and administrative forums.”206 After all, ac-
cording to one critic: 
A successful contract award can help a small business grow substantially. If a business[] 
mistakenly challenges the [g]overnment on the assumption that the [g]overnment er-
roneously granted the contract to a competitor, subjecting the business to further sanc-
tions for the error is improper. Although [sanctions] might help make a more stream-
lined protest system by reducing the number of protests, [they have] the unfortunate 
consequence of chilling the rights of contractors who do business with the [g]overn-
ment.207 
This observation makes an important point about the role of small businesses 
in federal procurement.208 Based on a related study, “[s]maller companies generate 
most of the protests and larger companies protest more strategically.”209 This intui-
tively makes sense, as small businesses generally rely on fewer revenue sources than 
large businesses, which typically enjoy numerous and well-diversified revenue 
sources.210 Thus, small businesses arguably have more at stake in bidding for gov-
ernment contracts than large businesses, and thereby have an increased incentive to 
protest an unfavorable contract award.211 
The same study revealed that “larger companies achieve more sustained pro-
tests [than smaller companies] . . . .”212 Perhaps this is because larger companies can 
better afford to invest in sophisticated resources to make more informed decisions 
on when filing a protest makes good business sense.213 Whatever the reason, this is 
a significant finding, as Congress strives to maximize small business participation in 
federal acquisitions.214 Accordingly, any proposal that seeks to decrease meritless 
protests must consider the proposal’s impact on small businesses.215 
In addition to these concerns, although the FAR does not specifically label this 
remedy as a “sanction,” Congress apparently has already determined and codified 
what constitutes sanctionable conduct in the context of federal procurement.216 FAR 
33.102(b)(3), for example, provides that the head of the procurement agency may 
“[r]equire the awardee to reimburse the Government’s costs, as provided in this par-
agraph, where a postaward protest is sustained as the result of an awardee’s intentional 
                                                          
 206. Cantor, supra note 196, at 176. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. 
 209. STEVEN M. MASER, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING: LESSONS FROM BID PROTESTS OF 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOURCE SELECTIONS at 21 (2012), available at http://www.businessofgovernment. 
org/report/improving-government-contracting-lessons-bid-protests-department-defense-source-selections. 
 210. Id. at 21-22. 
 211. Id. at 22. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 21-22. 
 214. FAR 19.201(a) (2016) (“It is the policy of the Government to provide maximum practicable opportunities in 
its acquisitions to small business . . . .”).  
 215. Accord id. 
 216. Id. 33.102(b)(3). 
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or negligent misstatement, misrepresentation, or miscertification.”217 Moreover, the GAO con-
tends that sanctions may produce “the unintended consequence of harming the fed-
eral procurement system by discouraging participation in federal contracting and, in 
turn, limiting competition.”218 For these reasons, sanctions are an inappropriate 
means to resolve the issue at hand.219 
2. Past Performance Evaluations 
In addition to sanctions, some critics of the protest system advocate that the 
government should consider an offeror’s protest history during past performance 
evaluations.220 The FAR enumerates past performance as “one indicator of an offe-
ror’s ability to perform [a] contract successfully.”221 If a procuring agency elects to 
evaluate past performance, it must consider “[t]he currency and relevance of the in-
formation, source of the information, context of the data, and general trends in con-
tractors’ performance.”222 
Just as with sanctions, however, the GAO is concerned that considering protest 
history in past performance evaluations would yield unintended consequences—es-
pecially decreased competition—that outweigh any perceived gains in efficiency.223 
“Importantly, any system that imposes penalties on contractors for filing frivolous 
protests would require adequate due process protections to avoid punishing a com-
pany for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest.”224 Most significantly, how-
ever, an offeror’s protest history most likely has no bearing on the “offeror’s ability 
to perform [a] contract successfully.”225 Evaluating an offeror’s protest history, then, 
would controvert the FAR’s requirement to consider relevant past performance.226 
Thus, evaluating protest history is also an inappropriate means to reduce meritless 
protests.227 
C. Inspiration from State Procurement Regulations and the NFL 
Instead of punishing contractors for filing meritless protests, a better strategy 
to decrease meritless protests, as well as the government’s costs to resolve them, is 
to require protestors to submit a bond with their protest equal to a percentage of the 
total contract value.228 In the event the GAO sustains a protest or the procuring 
                                                          
 217. Id. (emphasis added). 
 218. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives, supra note 188, at 12. 
 219. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1. 
 220. See, e.g., Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Com-
mittee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, supra note 188, at 13 (identifying various suggestions to disin-
centivize frivolous protests). 
 221. FAR 15.305(a)(2)(i) (2016). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives, supra note 188, at 13. 
 224. Id.  
 225. FAR 15.305(a)(2)(i) (2016). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.  
 228. See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
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agency takes corrective action, the GAO or the procuring agency, respectively, would 
return the protest bond to the protestor.229 If the GAO dismisses the protest, how-
ever, the government would retain the bond to offset its administrative costs to re-
solve the protest.230 This proposed solution quells the punitive undertones of sanc-
tions and negative past performance evaluations and adopts a more equitable 
approach to address the issue of meritless protests.231 At least four states currently 
employ a variation of this approach, as does the NFL via the Coaches’ Challenge 
Rule.232 
1. State Procurement Regulations 
For example, in Florida, protestors must submit a bond with their protest equal 
to one percent of the estimated contract value.233 If the procuring agency prevails 
against the protest, it recovers its costs—except attorney’s fees—through the protest 
bond and returns the remainder to the protestor.234 Equally, if the protestor prevails 
on its protest, the procuring agency (1) returns the bond to the protestor and (2) pays 
the protestor’s costs and charges—excluding attorney’s fees—to pursue the pro-
test.235 
Hawaii employs a similar approach with a slight variation.236 Instead of requir-
ing a bond equal to one percent of the estimated contract value, Hawaii requires a 
$1,000 bond for contracts valued at less than $500,000; a $2,000 bond for contracts 
valued between $500,001 and $1,000,000; and a bond equal to one-half per cent of 
the estimated contract value if that value is greater than $1,000,000.237 In no event, 
however, may a protest bond exceed $10,000.238 As in Florida, Hawaii’s protest reg-
ulation requires the procuring agency to return the bond to a successful protestor.239 
Unlike Florida’s regulations, however—where the state returns the remainder of the 
protest bond to the protestor after assessing the state’s costs to resolve the protest—
the protestor forfeits the entire bond to the state if it protests unsuccessfully.240 
In Nevada, a protestor must submit a bond with its protest equal to 25% of the 
successful bid.241 If the protest succeeds, the state returns the bond to the protes-
tor.242 If the procuring agency sustains the protest, Nevada’s Department of Admin-
istration holds a hearing to assess the costs involved in resolving the protest.243 The 
                                                          
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.042(2)(c) (West 2016). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015).  
 237. Id.  
 238. Id.  
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 333.370(2)-(3) (West 2015).  
 242. Id. § 333.370(10). 
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state then recoups its incurred costs from the bond and returns the remainder to the 
protestor.244 
Finally, within its Department of Transportation, Tennessee requires a protes-
tor to submit a bond with its protest equal to 5% of the estimated total project cost.245 
The state, however, only retains the bond if the Department commissioner deter-
mines (1) that the protestor pursued the protest in bad faith, or (2) if “the protest 
does not state on its face a valid basis for protest.”246 If the commissioner makes 
either one of these findings, he must notify the protestor in writing of the decision 
to retain the protest bond.247 
According to the National Association of State Procurement Officials 
(NASPO), there is insufficient data to confirm the degree to which protest bonds 
discourage frivolous protests.248 In spite of this sparse data, what is more clear is that 
the rationale for protest bonds is to minimize meritless protests and to allow a state 
to reduce its administrative costs to resolve protests.249 Moreover, a protest bond 
undoubtedly changes an unsuccessful offeror’s mindset when it comes to the decision 
of whether to file a protest.250 Instead of asking what they have to lose by protesting, 
unsuccessful offerors subject to a protest bond requirement must evaluate whether 
the time to acquire a bond and the risk of losing it justify protesting in the first 
place.251 
2. The NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule 
The NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule further clarifies the wisdom behind protest 
bonds.252 As previously discussed, the NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule affords a team 
two opportunities per game to challenge various rulings on the field.253 To initiate a 
challenge, a coach simply throws a red flag onto the field from the sideline after the 
previous play and before the next play begins.254 A previously unmentioned caveat 
to rule, however, is that a team must use a timeout for each challenge.255 If the official 
upholds the challenge, the Rule reinstates the timeout.256 If the official overrules the 
challenge, however, the challenging team forfeits its timeout.257 
                                                          
 244. Id.  
 245. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-1-505(b)(3) (West 2016). 
 246. Id. § 54-1-505(b)(6). 
 247. Id. 
 248. DEAN STOTLER ET AL., STATE BID PROTESTS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE PROCUREMENT 
OFFICIALS 4 (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.naspo.org/dnn/portals/16/ docu-
ments/.FINAL_NASPO_BidProtests_Research_Brief_042413.pdf.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Defense Industry Daily Staff, supra note 73 (highlighting General Carlson’s view that the current protest 
system encourages protests because bidders have nothing to lose by filing them); see also STOTLER ET AL., supra note 
248, at 4 (describing the rationale for protest bonds among the states that use them). 
 252. See GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63 (requiring a coach to put a timeout at stake before challenging any ruling 
on the field). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id.  
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 257. GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63 
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By requiring a team to put a timeout at stake, this provision prevents the 
Coaches’ Challenge from being a mere roll of the dice and equitably balances each 
team’s interest in fair rulings with the officials’ interest in minimizing game delays.258 
Undeniably, “challenges are part of game management, because they are directly 
linked to timeouts and can cause the loss of time on the clock, putting [a] team in a 
bad situation.”259 A coach must accordingly analyze the costs and benefits of a chal-
lenge to his team before he throws his red flag.260 Emphatically, “[u]nless the evi-
dence is clear-cut, a rational decision must be made, not an emotional one.”261 
Just as state protest bond requirements impose an additional analytical compo-
nent on the decision to protest, the Coaches’ Challenge Rule illustrates the principle 
that, in order to prevent abuse of a protest system, the protestor must have skin in 
the game.262 Conceivably, if the Coaches’ Challenge Rule did not require a team to 
use a timeout in order to challenge a ruling on the field, coaches would have no in-
centive to use their challenges judiciously.263 The same holds true if the Rule did not 
limit the number of challenges a team may use per game.264 
Based on GAO protest statistics, the current federal procurement protest 
scheme is akin to a coaches challenge rule that does not require a team to use a 
timeout prior to a challenge.265 That is, the increased frequency of protests to the 
GAO, coupled with the simultaneous decrease in the number of sustained protests, 
suggest that unsuccessful offerors are abusing the system.266 Consequently, the gov-
ernment bears significant costs to address meritless protests.267 
3. Integrating Protest Bonds into Federal Procurement Regulations 
Based on the state protest regulations discussed above and the intricacies of the 
NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule, there are a variety of potential approaches to inte-
grate protest bonds into federal procurement regulations to discourage meritless pro-
tests and equitably distribute protest costs between the protestor and the govern-
ment.268 The simplest—and arguably most cost-effective—solution would closely 
mirror Hawaii’s protest regulation and the Coaches’ Challenge Rule.269 That is, re-
quire a protestor to submit a bond with its protest equal to a certain percentage of 
                                                          
 258. See, e.g., Lombardi, McCarthy’s Challenge Raises Red Flag, Costs Packers Chance, NFL NETWORK (Sept. 28, 2010, 
9:40 PM; last updated Aug. 3, 2012, 10:23 AM), available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81aeb-
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estimated contract value.270 If the protestor wins, the government would return the 
bond to the protestor in full.271 If the protestor loses, the government would retain 
the full amount of the bond.272 Intuitively, this all-or-nothing approach would be 
simple to administer.273 The downside, however, is that it might not produce the 
most “fair” result in every case.274 
Alternatively, Congress could implement a protest bond scheme similar to Ne-
vada’s.275 Under this approach, a protestor would submit a bond in the amount of a 
certain percentage of the estimated contract value.276 If the protestor is successful, 
the government would return the entire bond to the protestor.277 If the protestor is 
unsuccessful, however, the government would retain the value of its costs to resolve 
the protest and return the remainder to the protestor.278 This approach is likely more 
administratively burdensome than Hawaii’s, as the government in this case would 
have to track its costs to resolve a protest.279 At the same time, however, this ap-
proach appears to more equitably balance the costs involved to address a protest by 
returning any unused portion of the protest bond to the protestor.280 
A third source of variation among state protest regulations is the amount of the 
protest bond.281 For example, some states impose a fixed protest bond when the 
estimated contract value falls within a certain dollar range.282 Other states base pro-
test bond requirements on a percentage of contract value.283 One potential issue with 
this approach is that, once contract value exceeds a certain threshold, the required 
bond will dwarf the government’s costs to address the protest.284 An equitable ap-
proach to deter meritless protests should not result in a windfall for the government 
in the event a protestor loses a protest.285 One way to mitigate this risk would be to 
                                                          
 270. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015) (requiring the protestor to submit a bond that varies 
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establish a maximum value for a protest bond.286 In any event, to establish a suitable 
protest bond requirement at the federal level, legislators should consider that the 
bond must be large enough to deter meritless protests, but not so great as to resemble 
a punitive remedy.287 
Ultimately, the decision to integrate protest bonds into the federal procurement 
system belongs to Congress, which must consider several factors in its analysis.288 At 
a minimum, a protest bond requirement must preserve “fairness and the right of 
access to . . . administrative forums.”289 Inherent in this principle is the importance 
of considering potential impacts on small businesses.290 One way to address this issue 
is to establish separate protest bond requirements for large and small businesses.291 
Congress must also ensure that the details of a protest bond requirement are other-
wise compatible with related regulations like CICA and the Small Business Act.292 
Notwithstanding this non-exhaustive list of challenges, incorporating a protest bond 
requirement into federal procurement regulations is certainly feasible.293 Based on 
the foregoing analysis, Congress should integrate a protest bond requirement into 
federal procurement regulations in an effort to (1) suppress the apparent “What do 
we have to lose?” mentality that the current system perpetuates and (2) to decrease 
the frequency of meritless protests.294 
V. CONCLUSION 
Statistically, the frequency of bid protests to the GAO continues to increase 
while the percentage of sustained protests continues to decrease.295 Moreover, with 
a current average effectiveness rate of 42%—which accounts for sustained protests 
and protests where an agency voluntarily takes corrective action—roughly 60% of 
protests filed with the GAO lack merit.296 As a result, the government suffers the 
increasing administrative burden to address protests that the GAO ultimately dis-
misses or denies.297 Although the overarching benefits of protests probably outweigh 
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the costs, this circumstance raises the question of whether opportunities exist to de-
crease meritless protests and the government’s administrative costs to resolve 
them.298 
At least four states have confronted this issue by requiring protestors to submit 
a bond with their protest equal to a certain percentage of estimated contract value.299 
Instead of asking what they have to lose by protesting unfavorable procurement ac-
tions, protestors in these states must first assess whether the time and expense of 
submitting a bond justifies their protest.300 
The NFL has also tackled this issue by adopting the Coaches’ Challenge 
Rule.301 By requiring a team to use a timeout in order to challenge a ruling on the 
field, a coach must analyze the costs and benefits of a challenge to his team before 
he throws his red flag.302 Moreover, the Rule requires Coaches to challenge based 
principally on reason rather than emotion.303 
To date, Congress has unsuccessfully resolved the issue at hand.304 It has con-
templated imposing sanctions on frivolous protests and permitting procuring agen-
cies to consider an offeror’s protest record during past performance evaluations.305 
Both proposals failed, however, due to their punitive nature.306 Unlike these histori-
cally proposed solutions, a protest bond requirement would exude less punitive char-
acteristics and would more equitably balance the administrative costs to address pro-
tests between procurement agencies and their private sector counterparts.307 
Accordingly, Congress should consider amending federal bid protest regulations to 
require protestors to include a bond with their protest equal to a percentage of total 
contract value in an effort to (1) suppress the apparent “What do we have to lose?” 
mentality that the current protest system perpetuates and (2) to decrease the fre-
quency of meritless protests.  
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